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Community custom has played a limited but important role in the
law of property. In addition to a few major historic examples such
as mining camp rules and whaling, property law sometimes relies on
community custom, for example in adverse possession, nuisance law,
and beach access. This Article proposes an informational theory of
custom in property law. Custom is subject to a communicative tradeoff
in the law: all else being equal, informationally demanding customs
requirean audiencewitha high degreeof commonknowledge.General
customs already known throughout society do not require much extra
publicity from the law, and the law can easily draw on such customs.
By contrast, customs that vary by community raise the question of the
needforprocessingbynon-expertaudiences,i.e.,outgroupdutyholders
and government ofﬁcials. This tradeoff helps explain the differential
receptiveness to various customs and the process by which they are
formalizediftheyareadopted intothelaw.Theinformation-costtheory
suggests that enthusiasts and skeptics of custom have both tended to
ignore this process. The theory is then applied to some suggestive
evidence from grazing customs and the pedis possessio doctrine in
mining law, under which miners have pre-discovery rights to the spot
being worked. Finally, the information-cost theory of custom sheds
some light on the history and controversies over the numerus clausus
(standardization and limitation of the set of basic property forms) and
on the question of baselines of property entitlements in the law of
takings.
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INTRODUCTION
Community custom has played a limited but important role in the law
of property. In some well-known major historic examples such as mining
camp rules and whaling, property law has adopted wholesale the customs
developedbycommunitiesthatstandinaspecialrelationshiptouseconﬂicts.
Although less common today, the law sometimes qualiﬁes property rights
through the recognition or adoption of customs, as in the case of beach
access in some states.1 Less dramatically but more pervasively, law looks to
custom to supply the content for notions like customary use as the standard
for continuity in the law of adverse possession,2 the locality rule inthe law of
nuisance,3and"ordinary wearandtear"inthe law ofwaste.4
This Article proposes an informational theory of custom in property
law. Custom is subject to a general communicative tradeoff: all else being
equal, customs that are demanding from an informational standpoint require
an audience with a high degree of common knowledge.5 General customs
already known throughout society do not require much extra publicity from
the law, and the law can easily draw on such customs. By contrast, legal
enforcement of customs that vary by community may require processing by
non-expert audiences, i.e., out-group duty-holders and government ofﬁcials.
This tradeoff helps explain when courts are (and are not) receptive to the
incorporation of custom into the law, as well as the process whereby courts
remove the need for contextual knowledge in the application and following
1 See, e.g., State of Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
2 For an explicit acceptance of custom as the standard for use in adverse possession,
see Nome2000v.Fagerstrom,799P.2d 304 (Alaska1990).Inothercases,customary
use in terms of what is expected for the neighborhood is quite common. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210 (1970) (seasonal use of vacation home sufﬁces for
continuity requirement in adverse possession).
3 See, e.g., Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852, 865 (1879); see also Robert C.
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls,4 0U .C HI.L .R EV. 681, 728-33 (1973) (proposing nuisance liability
for activities that are perceived to be "unneighborly under contemporary community
standards").
4 Tenants are expectedtoreturn leased premises to landlords attheend oftheleasehold
intheirinitialcondition,normalwearandtearexcepted.SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 12.2(3) (1977). In most applications, this can
also be regarded as a contractual default, making the application of custom easier
than in more impersonal contexts.
5 Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience,5 5S TAN.
L. REV. 1105 (2003).
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of custom. That is, in keeping with the informational tradeoff, courts exhibit
a tendency to formalize custom in the course of adopting and adapting it for
generalapplication.
I. THE DEBATE OVER CUSTOM IN LAW
One perennial debate in legal theory centers around the relationship between
custom and law. On the one hand, authors like Savigny, Blackstone, Hayek,
and Epstein express an enthusiasm for custom, especially as a source for
law.6 Sometimes this goes so far that lawyers and judges are regarded as
passiverecipientsofthis materialintheprocessof itsbecominglaw.7Others,
like Maine, Bentham, and modern legal centralists, see the law as something
wholly distinct from custom and assign legal actors, especially legislators,
the primary role in shaping the law.8 The polar positions are not the only
possible ones, as Bruno Leoni points out.9 Leoni sees law as drawing —
and depending for its existence — on custom, but sees a role for lawyers
and judges in generalizing and crystallizing custom into law. One aspect of
this relationship is the formalization of custom — the stripping out of its
dependence oncommunitycontext — as itbecomes general law.
6 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,1C OMMENTARIES *63-92; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,N EW
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS,E CONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978);
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,L EGISLATION AND LIBERTY 46-47 (1973) [hereinafter
HAYEK,L AW,L EGISLATION AND LIBERTY];F RIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY,O F THE
VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward
trans., Arno Press 1975) (1814); Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v.
Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News,7 8V A.
L. REV. 85, 101-02 (1992).
7 Others, like Robert Ellickson and to some extent Eugen Ehrlich, do not emphasize
how the law incorporates custom but rather stress the role of custom as sometimes
contradictory to but also often more important than law in everyday life. See EUGEN
EHRLICH,F UNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (W. Moll trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1936) (1913); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,O RDER WITHOUT LAW
(1991). As mentioned earlier, I am focusing here on the transmission of norms from
custom to law; cf. David Nelken, Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural Legalities,
9T HEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 443 (2008) (arguing that Ehrlich’s living law captured
the interdependence of ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial law).
8 JEREMY BENTHAM,AC OMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1931); JEREMY BENTHAM,T HE
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 109-22 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931); HENRY SUMNER MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 1-20 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (3d ed. 1866).
9 BRUNO LEONI,F REEDOM AND THE LAW 216-18 (3d ed. 1991).
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Even writers like Blackstone can be regarded as treating nonlegal custom
and the version implemented in the common law as being somewhat
distinct. Indeed Blackstone is known for the greatest elaboration of a
"test" for whether a custom should be adopted by judicial decision. This
"test" is not always how courts approach custom, but it has been and
continues to be an inﬂuential reference point.10 For Blackstone, a custom
was agoodcandidateforincorporation intothe common lawifit satisﬁedthe
requirementsofantiquity,continuity,peaceableuse,certainty,reasonableness,
compulsoriness (not by license), and consistency.11 Under the heading of
certainty would come a lot of what I will be calling formalism, in the sense
of non-context-dependence of information.12 Blackstone gives as examples
ofcustomsthatwould be toouncertaina rulethatlandsshoulddescend tothe
mostworthyoftheowner’sissue(asopposedtothenextmale)andacustomto
payinlieuoftitheseithertwoorthreepence,astheownerpleases(asopposed
to simply two pence, or a year’s improved value).13 The uncertain customs
might not be so uncertain to a community member, but this would not make
them candidatesforadoption into the law.
Interestingly, various proponents of custom, like Savigny and Leoni,
analogize law to language in explaining the role of custom and its
evolution.14 Like language, custom bubbles up from practice and cannot be
easily constructed from scratch (cf. Esperanto). Also, like language, custom
evolves into various dialects.15 To this we might add that the sociolinguistic
variation we see between community dialects and more general dialects (like
Standard American English) have their analogies in custom and the law. In
particular, the style of language used in communities versus larger groupings
ischaracterizedbylesserformalism(interpretationwillvarymorebycontext)
in both language and the law.16 Greater informality and need for context can
also help deﬁne and maintain group identity: only those in the know will
10 See, e.g., State of Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969); J.H.
BALFOUR BROWNE,T HE LAW OF USAGES AND CUSTOMS (S.S. Clarke ed., Jersey
City, Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1st Am. ed. 1881) (1875); JOHN D. LAWSON,T HE
LAW OF USAGES AND CUSTOMS (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1881).
11 BLACKSTONE,1C OMMENTARIES *76-78.
12 See Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression,4F OUND.
SCI. 25, 49-53 (1999); Smith, supra note 5, at 1112-13.
13 BLACKSTONE,1C OMMENTARIES *78.
14 SAVIGNY, supra note 6, at 19; FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY,S YSTEM OF THE
MODERN ROMAN LAW 36-37 (William Holloway trans., 1980); see also LEONI,
supra note 9, at 218; Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law,5 4A M.J .C OMP.
L. 499, 527-32 (2006).
15 BROWNE, supra note 10, § 17, at 20-21.
16 See, e.g., Jean-Marc Dewaele, How to Measure Formality in Speech: A Model
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ﬁnd it easy to employ community context in interpretation. In-group slang is
based on this type of context-speciﬁc informality, with Leet or leetspeak on
theInternet beingone particularlyprominentrecent example.17
Judges are not the only ﬁlter between custom and the legal world.
Interestingly it is another communicative act that has the tendency to strip
out some contextual information: proving custom to a jury. It has been a
long time since juries were self-informing, but jurors are still drawn from
the community, in a broad geographic sense. Juries can be expected to be
able to draw on some community background but, apart from the possibility
of resurrecting merchant juries, lay jurors tend not to have the knowledge
from special communities to which they do not belong. As sociolinguistic
studies have shown, this type of cross-community communication is itself
likely to result in a signiﬁcant degree of formalization of custom.18 Thus,
the need to communicate customs to those outside the community, including
thejudgeandjury,ensuresthatputtingcustomsintoevidenceisanadditional
processcontributing to formalization.19
In a more modern vein, Friedrich Hayek’s heavy reliance on custom has
drawn the familiar criticism for naivete ´, in particular for its exaggeration
of the role of judges.20 But one of the more realistic aspects of the process
that Hayek implicitly advocates is the partial formalization of preexisting
custom.Hayek’s enthusiasm for custom leads him away from the question of
the interface between custom and more impersonal mechanisms. The price
system, which he sees as a highly effective method for coordinating the rich
but local and widely dispersed knowledge of ordinary economic actors, only
worksbecauseitboilsdownalotofinformationintoaveryformalformat.Itis
true thatan individualpricemay beembedded in the contextof a transaction,
but the information that travels as a signal is the price itself, divorced from
of Synchronic Variation, in APPROACHES TO SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 119
(Kari Sajavaara & Courtney Fairweather eds., 1996).
17 See, e.g., Christopher Rhoads, What Did U $@y? Online Language Finds
Its Voice,W ALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB118679550023894850.html; Leet, in WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Leet#_note-4 (last visited May 1, 2008). Even the term "Leet" or "1337"
(and other variants) originated from having "elite" status online.
18 The need for jurors to deliberate over custom may reinforce this effect, depending
in part on the size of the jury and how many votes are required for a verdict.
19 The substantive requirements of certainty, uniformity, and notoriety also require
certain types of testimony and forbid others. See BROWNE, supra note 10, § 72, at
117-25; id. at 120 n.6 (citing Cope v. Dodd, 13 Pa. 33 (1850)).
20 John Hasnas, Hayek, the Common Law, and Fluid Drive, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
79 (2005).
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muchofthecontext.Inseeingincustomasimilarmechanismforeconomizing
on information, Hayek seemed to believe that in adopting customs to the
common law judges would ﬁnd what is generalizable in them and strip away
theaccidental.21Thus,communicationbypricesinamarketandadjudicating
disputes through custom both require some generalization and abstraction
away from particular contexts. Hayek is vague about what exactly judges
do, and, as has been pointed out, he overlooked the frequent passivity of
common-law judges and the role of the jury in using custom in common-law
cases.22 More importantly from our point of view, it is not just the arbitrary
aspects of custom that need to be shorn away but some of the contextual
information that makes its burden on non-community members greater. This
process is consistent with the Blackstonian ﬁlter and, as mentioned earlier, is
not solely a function of judging. The process of proving a custom to a jury of
non-community members islikely tohave asimilareffect.
Critics of a role for custom in law see it as too uncertain and eclectic.
On this view, for custom to be usable at all, legislators or judges must do
most of the essential work, at the end of which custom-based law would be
no different from other law.23 In particular, the traditional requirement that
a custom be reasonable calls upon judges to make substantive decisions and
putstheprocess on a path towards no special role for custom.24 Descriptively
it is the case that the common law relies less on custom than it once did, and
this trend has only been reinforced by the positive and normative claims of
positivists (including in this respect the Legal Realists) that law gets its force
from a rule of recognition, which leaves little room for custom to operate
21 HAYEK,L AW,L EGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 72-74.
22 Hasnas, supra note 20, at 100. By contrast, Richard Posner criticizes Hayek for
assuming that the process of adopting custom as law required excessive passivity
of judges. See Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law, and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 147, 150 (2005). Hayek viewed judges, like any other candidate for central
planner, as unable to gather and use the information required for engineering correct
rules in the fashion Posner assumes. See Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders,
Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law,9 3I OWA L. REV. 559 (2008).
23 See, e.g.,J OHN AUSTIN,T HE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 30-32
(Noonday 1954) (1832) ("[B]efore [a custom] is adopted by the courts, and clothed
with the legal sanction, it is merely a rule of positive morality."); Richard Craswell,
Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE
AND COMMERCIAL LAW 132 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (arguing
that trade customs do not make an independent substantive contribution in cases
ostensibly involving custom).
24 James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and
Reason?,5 8U .C HI.L .R EV. 1321 (1991).
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as law on its own.25 Indeed, on this view, the rule of recognition is the only
custom needed. And although a rule of recognition could theoretically point
to custom, positivists wind up emphasizing the contribution of judges and
legislators in determining the content of the law.26 Positivists and other legal
centralists also make a corresponding normative claim, that custom on its
own lacks legitimacy and bears no guarantee of suitability for anyone other
thanitsgenerators.27Althoughproponentsoftheefﬁciencyofsocialnormsdo
not always claim that customswill beefﬁcient or desirable outside close-knit
groups of origin, the centralist skeptics are more likely to see custom as
the product of oppression within such groups. Thus, normatively, in order
to apply customs to those outside the group of origin we need some ﬁlter
to prevent illegitimate customs from spreading. For example, while mining
customs became part of general mining law, some norms in the mining
campswereexplicitlydiscriminatoryand,ifadoptedaslaw,wouldhavebeen
unconstitutional, especially by today’s lights.28 But the centralists go farther:
theprocessofﬁlteringisnotdistinguishedfromstartingfromscratch,andthe
25 See George Rutherglen, Custom and Usage as Action Under Color of State Law:
An Essay on the Forgotten Terms of Section 1983,8 9V A.L .R EV. 925 (2003).
26 Id. at 960; see also H.L.A. HART,T HE CONCEPT OF LAW 44-49, 100-10 (2d ed.
1994). On the compatibility of Legal Realism and Legal Positivism, see Brian Leiter,
Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278 (2001).
27 See, e.g.,M ORTON J. HORWITZ,T HE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1879-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 211-12 (1992) (arguing that in fashioning
the Uniform Commercial Code, Karl Llewellyn "endowed economically dominant
commercial practices with undeserved normativity").
28 See, e.g., Gavin Wright & Karen Clay, Order Without Law: Property Rights During
the California Gold Rush,4 2E XPLORATIONS ECON.H IST. 155, 169 (2005); see also
David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases,4 1W M.
&M ARY L. REV. 211 (1999) (discussing state anti-Chinese legislation and its
invalidation by Lochner-era federal courts on Fourteenth Amendment grounds);
Thomas Wuil Joo, New "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the Development of Substantive
Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353 (1995) (arguing that the
motivation for federal courts to strike down anti-Chinese legislation was the desire to
protect economic liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment). The homogeneity of the
miners’ culture probably made developing and enforcing norms easier, using
common cultural focal points, but the exclusionary aspect had its dark and violent
side as well. See Andrea G. McDowell, From Commons to Claims: Property Rights
in the California Gold Rush,1 4Y ALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2002); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr.
& C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the
California Gold Fields,6 1J .E CON.H IST. 114 (2001). The appropriateness of custom
for outsiders depends in part on the content of the custom and the extent to which
it legitimately constitutes the group, and these issues sometimes arise under
the reasonableness test for custom. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
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emphasis is on the active role of the judge or legislator at the center. Indeed
custom,likeothertraditions,canbeseenbythecentralistsasaninconvenient
obstacle to centralizedrational socialengineering.
The information-cost theory suggests that both the proponents and
opponents of adopting custom into law have been hasty at times. Proponents
need to be more sensitive to the informational burden placed on duty-holders
who are farther removed from the community that originated a custom.
Adoption into law is likely to increase that burden and some formalization
of the custom may be required as part of the adoption process. Indeed, law’s
lesser dependence on custom now as compared to centuries past reﬂects in
part the need for standardization appropriate to a large market economy and
a diverse polity.29 Opponents of community custom in the law tend to accuse
its proponents of mixing categories and not understanding the differences
between custom and law. But if custom tends to be formalized in the process
of its adoption into law, the resulting legal rule need not be that different in
character from other legal rules. It remains an empirical question whether
judges or other decisionmakers can makebetter legal rules by stripping some
of the information content out of custom, than they would by eschewing
customaltogether.
I will argue that the eclectic quality of custom-based law that offends the
centralists is sometimes the byproduct of this process of formalization. Also,
the process of formalizing a custom to make it more appropriate for wider
audiences partially allays concerns that custom in the law has not received
the proper consent from those it governs. Judges adopting Blackstonian
or other criteria for custom can beneﬁt from the dispersed information
possessed by communities, but the legal rule need not present as large an
imposition on non-community members as critics fear.
II. COMMUNICATING COMMUNITY CUSTOM
The role of custom or social norms has attracted much attention from legal
scholars and some economists. Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of
the study of social norms is the recognition that norms can serve as a
substitute for law, and can even thrive in the face of contrary law.30 The
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,5 3U .C HI.L .R EV. 711, 769
(1986).
29 On the tension, both historical and theoretical, between custom and standardization,
see infra Section IV.A.
30 ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 4-6.
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importance of custom in everyday life is a counterweight to legal centralism,
the view that governments (especially nonlocal governments) are the main
source of rules of conduct.31 Nevertheless, there have been famous episodes,
such as mining law, in which the law has adopted or adapted customary rules
for use in common-law adjudication and occasionally incorporated custom
into statutes. In other situations, local custom has been rejected outright as a
source oflaw.32
This Article will explore the question of when law incorporates the
custom of particular communities into the general law of property and
the informational constraints on this process. These constraints hold in all
communicative systems, but, in the case of custom, communities tend to
be both its authors and its audiences. From the point of view of the law,
custom is easiest to apply in its own context; it is when the audience
expands beyond originating communities that the tradeoff between an
information-rich custom and the size and heterogeneity of the audience
must be restruck.
Previous literature has not primarily focused on the information costs to
which customs give rise.33Intheliteratureonsocialnorms,itistheorizedthat
31 Id. at 138-40; see also Talia Fisher, Nomos Without Narrative,9T HEORETICAL
INQUIRIESL. 473 (2008); John Hasnas, The Depoliticization of Law,9T HEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 529, 534-41 (2008); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments:
Using Hostages to Support Exchange,7 3A M.E CON.R EV. 519, 520, 537 (1983).
32 Courtsvaryinthisregard,butinterestinglycourtsthatrejectcustomtendtodisparage
custom as a source of law rather than get into the merits of which rule is better.
One procedural explanation for this phenomenon is that the role of custom is often
couched in terms of whether evidence on the custom is admissible or not. In such
cases, custom is not allowed to trump general rules of law. For example, in Fisher
v. Steward, 1 Smith 60 (N.H. 1804), the court declared:
It has been said, that, by the usage of this part of the State, the person who ﬁnds
bees acquires a property in them wherever found. We recognize no such usage.
We have no local customs or usages which are binding in one part of the State
and not in another. If this be the law here, it must be so in every other part of the
State.
33 An exception is the growing awareness that outsider British colonists tended
to discount customary rights that did not ﬁt into an English law mold. See, e.g.,
WILLIAMCRONON,C HANGES IN THELAND:I NDIANS,C OLONISTS, AND THEECOLOGY
OF NEW ENGLAND 58-81 (1983); Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law
and Space in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand,2 4L AW &S OC.I NQUIRY 807,
811-12 (1999). Also, the complexity of local custom in common property regimes
is difﬁcult for outsiders to understand and therefore not easily susceptible to trading
on a market. Carol M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons:
Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common
Property Regime,1 0D UKEENVTL.L .&P OL’Y F. 45, 63-66 (1999) (discussing how
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normsthatemergeinaclose-knitcommunityhaveatendencytobeefﬁcientfor
the community members, but not necessarily for society at large.34 Coercion
within the group and various group dynamics can prevent community norms
from being ideal in the sense of efﬁcient or fair. Here I will focus on the
relations of communities and their customs to wider social groups. Like
individuals and business organizations, communities can create externalities
too. We can question the fairness of holding an actor bound by a custom she
maynot haveconsented to.
Efﬁciency and fairness in the narrow sense of the "correctness" of an
allocation rule does not completely exhaust the concerns raised by the
spread of custom beyond its immediate social environment in a community.
Additionally, custom makes informational demands on those who are
expected to abide by it and on those who are to enforce it. Consider
the example of marking sites for surgery to avoid the disturbingly common
problem of wrong-site surgery.35 Marking the correct limb (right or left)
using"Yes"orinitialsormarkingthewrongsidewithan"X"orredsockseem
equally efﬁcient and fair, but it turns out that for the semi-initiated, the red
sock requires the least background knowledge and is the easiest to transmit
to doctors who may not be closely linked into the network or community
(such as a hospital) devising the system. (For a surgeon not on the lookout
for a "Yes" the wrong limb can easily be mistaken for the correct one.) One
can imagine a newsletter informing the medical community in a city, state,
or nation that a "Yes" is a necessary condition for surgery, but this would
require extra communication cost: more information must be transmitted, as
compared to "No" or thered sock.
common property regimes "can be very complex and can bafﬂe outsiders entirely,"
making them difﬁcult to trade); see also James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies
and the Commodiﬁcation of Environmental Law,5 3S TAN.L .R EV. 607 (2000)
(exploring the tension between nonfungibilities of environmental commodities and
their tradability). In our terms, markets are an extensive context calling for reduced
information intensiveness along a variety of dimensions. See Smith, supra note 5,
at 1189; see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
34 ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 167-83.
35 Jennifer Steinhauer, So, the Brain Tumor’s on the Left, Right? Seeking Ways to
Reduce Mix-Ups in the Operating Room, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at A23; Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, Making Health Care Safer: A Critical Analysis
of Patient Safety Practices, ch. 43.2: Strategies to Avoid Wrong-Site Surgery
(July 2001), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/chap43b.htm; see also
Smith, supra note 5, at 1138-39; James W. Saxton & Maggie M. Finkelstein,
Can Adhesive Labels Prevent Wrong Site Surgery and Reduce Liability Risk?,1 2
WIDENER L. REV. 293 (2005).
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Informational demands increase with the social distance from the creators
of the custom. In the medical context, we worry about the new doctor in
a hospital. In previous work I argued that law is subject to this type of
informational tradeoff, which is characteristic of human communication in
general: at the same cost one can either communicate in an intense way
with a speciﬁc, close audience with common knowledge, or in a more
stripped-down, formal way with a more extensive audience. Within the
law, contract and property strike this tradeoff differently. In contract, the
primary audiences for contractual duties are close to the deal, either as
participants or, with slightly more distance, as third-party beneﬁciaries.
Correspondingly, contract law largely allows parties to create their own
customs in the course of dealing, and even devise their own idiosyncratic
language.36 This is true both of the common law of contract and the Uniform
Commercial Code.37 In general, realists and formalists have argued about the
extent to which context is relevant for contractual interpretation, but overall
morecontextisconsideredrelevantininterpretingcontractsthaninthecaseof
property.38Property,bycontrast,ismuchmoreformalinthesensethatitrelies
lessoncontextandimposesagreaterdegreeofstandardization,mostnotably
inthedoctrinethatpropertycomesinaclosedsetofbasicforms(or"building
blocks"),i.e.,thenumerus clausus.39Inbothcontractandproperty,third-party
adjudicatorsmustbeabletoﬁgureoutwhatisgoingon,buttheinformational
needs of judges to some extent track those of primary audiences, and judges
do seem to havesomeintuition about theinformational tradeoff.
This fundamental difference between contract and property makes sense
in terms of both the costs and beneﬁts of communication in the two areas.40
Incontractsasmallerandmoredeﬁnitesetofactorsneedstoprocessthedeal,
butthestakesarequitehighandconcentratedonthem.Thenatureofthedealis
largelyirrelevanttothirdparties.Andinthosesituationsinwhichthirdparties
do get involved — in the tort of interference with contract, assignments, and
36 Smith, supra note 5, at 1148-57, 1177-90.
37 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(a) (2004) ("Unless the context otherwise requires, words
or phrases deﬁned in this section, or in the additional deﬁnitions contained in other
articles of [the Uniform Commercial Code] that apply to particular articles or parts
thereof, have the meanings stated."); id. § 2-202 (course of performance and parole
or extrinsic evidence).
38 Smith, supra note 5, at 1177-90.
39 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Smith, supra
note 5, at 1148-57.
40 Smith, supra note 5, at 1148-67; Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts:
Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.L .R EV. 1175, 1207-14 (2006).
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third-party beneﬁciaries — contract law becomes more formal, in the sense I
amusinghereoflesscontext-dependent.41Propertyrequiresdifferentactions
and forbearance from a wide set of parties. In those aspects of property that
communicate the in rem right to the "rest of the world," the audience is as
wide and indeﬁnite as it can be, but the contribution that far-ﬂung parties
make consists largely of keeping off.
The various strategies used to delineate and enforce property rights
reﬂect the basic communicative tradeoff. If property is characterized by
an initial use of an exclusion strategy to deal with the basic delegation of
decision-making authority to owners and the prevention of basic theft in
the interest of protecting stability of expectations and autonomy, then the
message is a simple one that need not rely much on contextual information.42
However, sometimes the stakes increase and we get a shift to governance
— rules targeting use conﬂicts more directly.43 This can take the form of
exceptions to the right to exclude or additional rules of proper use. These
rules start to get more informationally demanding and the law rations them
more closely and seems to reﬂect the need to keep the message to far-ﬂung
parties within a reasonable cost. It is one thing to require neighbors to abide
by community norms, quite another to expect a stranger to know and abide
by them. A default license to hunt might well make sense in an area in which
many people hunt, but requiring a potential stranger hunting a wild animal to
know when it is still subject to capture raises a more difﬁcult informational
question.44
One large difference between the exclusion and governance strategies is
the heavier reliance of the former on modularity. Social and legal relations
are part of a complex system, and one method for managing complexity
is modularity.45 A system is partially decomposable if parts of the system
41 Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 54-55 (assignments); Smith, supra note 5, at
1186-87 (third-party beneﬁciaries); id. at 1166 & n.215 (tortious interference).
42 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights,3 1J .L EGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
43 Id.; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance,9 0V A.
L. REV. 965, 1021-45 (2004).
44 This particular problem is familiar in property from the famous case of Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). On the communicative aspect of the case, see
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property,5 2U .C HI.L .R EV. 73, 78, 85
(1985); Smith, supra note 5, at 1117-19.
45 HERBERT A. SIMON,T HE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981); see also
MODULARITY IN DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION (Gerhard Schlosser & Gu ¨nter P.
Wagner eds., 2004); Lauren W. Ancel & Walter Fontana, Plasticity, Evolvability,
and Modularity in RNA, 288 J. EXPERIMENTAL ZOOLOGY 242 (2000); Gu ¨nter P.
Wagner & Lee Altenberg, Complex Adaptations and the Evolution of Evolvability,
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can be identiﬁed within which interaction is dense and strong but between
which it is less dense and weaker. If so, these components can be treated as
modules such that modules only interact through interfaces. Other internal
information is hidden; hiding information allows activity within modules to
occur in partial isolation. The contribution the module makes to the working
of the whole system becomes more predictable. Modular systems are often
more resistant to shocks because damage can be contained with a module.
Likewise modular systems can evolve more easily through the modiﬁcation
or substitution of individual modules without causing ripple effects through
the entire system. In software, for example, modular structure is employed
in order to make program complexity easier to manage; parts of the software
combine in more predictable ways and decisions about one aspect will not
ripple out of control.46 If there is a common print-function that can be called
upon in certain standard ways, substituting a new print-function will cause
manageable change to the overall program. Likewise the teams that create
modular artifacts like software take advantage of modularity.47 With little or
no modularity, complexity can spiral outofcontrol.
The exclusion strategy in property beneﬁts from modularity. First, by
giving the owner a right to exclude, many use questions are delegated to that
owner.48 Information about the uses of the asset and the features of the owner
arelargely,thoughtnotcompletely,irrelevanttooutsiders.IfIwalkthrougha
parking lot, I know not to take cars and I need not know who the cars belong
to — whether it is a person or a corporation — the age or income or moral
worthinessoftheowner,orwhetherthecarisonloantoafriend.49Ineedonly
know that it is not mine and to keep off. Likewise the remedy for theft does
notmakeany inquiry intothesefeaturesoftheowner.Limitedexceptionsare
made for high-stakes situations in which bargaining is not feasible, such as
50 EVOLUTION 967 (1996); John J. Welch & David Waxman, Modularity and the
Cost of Complexity,5 7E VOLUTION 1723 (2003).
46 Object oriented programming in particular employs modularity. See, e.g.,G RADY
BOOCH,O BJECT-ORIENTED ANALYSIS AND DESIGN (1994); EDWARD YOURDON,
OBJECT-ORIENTED SYSTEM DESIGN:A N INTEGRATED APPROACH (1994).
47 See, e.g.,C ARLISS Y. BALDWIN &K IM B. CLARK,D ESIGN RULES:T HE POWER OF
MODULARITY 6-11, 169-94 (2000).
48 Henry E.Smith, Propertyand Property Rules,N.Y.U.L.REV. 1719, 1758-64(2004);
Smith, supra note 43, at 1021-45.
49 See J.E. PENNER,T HE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 29-30, 71 (1997); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,
101 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001); Smith, supra note 5, at 1151; Smith, supra note 42,
at S475.
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necessity.50 Evaluation of context becomes more important here — mostly
context about the person in need. If the one facing necessity — for example,
the need to ﬂee an assailant — had to endanger the life of the owner, then
necessitywouldnotapply.Moresystematically,areasofthelawlikenuisance
make more information about uses and users relevant, including the utility
of the activity, the hypersensitivity of the plaintiff, etc.51 This is a more
elaborate interface. Governance between adjacent private property owners
can be thought of as part of the interface between property modules. In the
caseofcommonproperty,governancerulesareinternaltolargemodules,with
relianceontheexclusionstrategytosendmessagesaboutdutiesofabstention
tonon-groupmembersoutsidethemodule.Incommonproperty,theproperty
module keeps all but a large group out but uses internal governance rules to
guide the behavior of thelargegroup that doeshave access.
As the example of common property suggests, human groupings like
communities can be regarded as modules. Organization theorists have
employed modularity to explain the structure of certain organizations,
especially those that produce modular products like computer software and
hardware.52 In this Article, I will apply these ideas to communities and show
how community boundaries function as modules and serve as an important
waystationfromthesmaller,closer-knitaudiencesthatcanengageinintensive
communication tomoreextensiveaudiencesbeyondthe community.
Interestingly, in the vast literature on modularity an important sub-
branch applies the concept of modularity to community. Sociologists and
50 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
51 WILLIAM L. PROSSER,H ANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 596-602 (4th
ed. 1971) (considering the "reasonable use" balancing test and citing modern
case applications). Under the Second Restatement, a nuisance is a substantial
nontrespassory invasion of use and enjoyment of land that is caused either by
intentional and unreasonable activities, or negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous
activities. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821F, 822, 826-28 (1979); 6A
AMERICANLAW OF PROPERTY § 28.22, at 66, § 28.26, at 75-77 (A. James Casner ed.,
1954) (emphasizing the vagaries associated with, and importance of, a determination
as to whether a defendant’s conduct is unreasonable); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER &
FLEMING JAMES,J R., THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.24, at 70-74 (1956) (discussing the
importance of reasonableness considerations in nuisance cases). See generally Jeff
L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance,5 4A LB.L .R EV. 189,
212-14 (documenting the limited adoption of the balance of the utilities test for
reasonableness, and citing cases); Smith, supra note 43.
52 See BALDWIN &C LARK, supra note 47; MANAGING IN THE MODULAR
AGE:A RCHITECTURES,N ETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Raghu Garud, Arun
Kumaraswamy & Richard N. Langlois eds., 2003); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity
in Technology and Organization,4 9J .E CON.B EHAV.&O RG. 19 (2002).
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sociolinguistshave usednetworktheorytostudythediffusionofinformation
and patterns of communication.53 Theorists have used algorithms forﬁnding
modules to discover "communities" through the identiﬁcation of groups with
denseandstrongtiesthatareonlyweaklyconnectedtotheworldoutside.54For
our purposes, this application of network theory allows the communicative
tradeoff to be more precise and testable in principle. Basically, we expect a
correlation of formalism with distance from a community. The relevant
notion of distance here is social distance as captured in part by the length of
the path between the speaker and the audience and the weakness of the links
in that path.55 Thus, with long-distance communications and especially the
Internet one can be socially close to physically distant people, although the
importance of shared implicit knowledge and sometimes physical proximity
that supports itare easilyoverlooked.56
Examples of such a tradeoff in communication more generally have
been established.57 Other studies are consistent with this tradeoff, including
Mark Granovetter’s work on "weak ties."58 Granovetter provides suggestive
evidenceforahypothesisframedintermsofnetworktheory:messagestravel
longsocialdistances,modeledbylongpathlength,throughweakties.Strong
ties are characterized by spending a large amount of time together, emotional
intensity, intimacy and reciprocity, and the strength of a tie between two
persons is predicted to correlate with the overlap of their social networks.
Communities are characterized by strong internal ties and weaker ties to the
outside. Tothis picture we might add that the communication along the weak
ties from one community to another tends to be "formal" as beﬁts weak ties,
53 See, e.g.,L ESLEY MILROY,L ANGUAGE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 139-44 (1980);
James Milroy & Lesley Milroy, Mechanisms of Change in Urban Dialects: The
Role of Class, Social Network and Gender, in 1T HE SOCIOLINGUISTICS READER:
MULTILINGUALISM AND VARIATION 179 (Peter Trudgill & Jenny Cheshire eds.,
1998).
54 See, e.g., Aaron Clauset,M.E.J. Newman & Christopher Moore, Finding Community
Structure in Very Large Networks,7 0P HYS.R EV. E 70, 066111 (2004); M.E.J.
Newman, Modularity and Community Structure in Networks, 103 PROC.N ATL.
ACAD.S CI. USA 8577 (2006).
55 Social distance may but need not correlate with geographic and temporal distance.
56 See, e.g.,J OHN SEELY BROWN &P AUL DUGUID,T HE SOCIAL LIFE OF INFORMATION
11-33, 167-70, 223-31 (2002) (arguing for the importance of non-explicit knowledge
in the information age and the importance of social distance).
57 See, e.g., Dewaele, supra note 16.
58 Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties,7 8A M.J .S OC. 1360 (1973); see
also Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness,9 1A M.J .S OC. 481 (1985).
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in which intensity of interaction and common knowledge cannot be as easily
assumed. Communities thus have a modular structure, and the formal tools
used to study the nature of modules have been applied to the detection of
communities in networks.
This use of network theory makes it possible to formalize the notions of
information intensity and audience extensiveness. In previous work I began
to show that this communicative tradeoff operates in the law and is why
judges and other legal decision-makers might be inclined in the direction
of more formalism in less intimate contexts.59 Here I am suggesting that
distancefromacommunitycentercanbearelevantmeasureofextensiveness
forpurposes ofthe communicative tradeoff.
Formalism here simply means relative invariance to context. This
deﬁnition can be used to capture many instances of formalism: thus
mathematicalformalism ismoreinvariant tocontext in its interpretationthan
are other forms of communication.60 In the hospital example above, some
of the forms of communicating which side to operate on, like using initials,
are less formal than "yes" or "no" or the red sock because they require more
background knowledge and attention to context; they are less formal than
the sock in particular. According to the communicative tradeoff, we should
expect messages to tend to become more formal as they leave the conﬁnes
of the community of origin. Either the communication must become more
stripped down in order not to overload the more extensive audience, or more
processing costs will have to be incurred. This could include educating the
moreextensiveaudiencewiththerelevantbackgroundknowledge,oritcould
involveinformingthemabout theparticular customaryruleatissue.
The ease of incorporating community custom into the law is determined
in part by this basic communicative tradeoff, and the informational tradeoff
is reﬂected in the limited portability of custom. At a very gross level, the
greater receptiveness to contract customs than property customs is a striking
example of this: contract is more open to the use of industry custom because
therelevantsetofduty-holdersisclosertothedealthanisthecaseinmanyin
rem property situations. But within property itself, some customs are better
candidates for generalization than others. In addition to questions about
efﬁciency and fairness, community customs make different informational
demands on wider audiences. As I will show, the communicative tradeoff
allows us to derive a number of subsidiary propositions about the adoption
or adaptation of community custom into the law.
59 See Smith, supra note 5; Smith, supra note 40.
60 See sources cited in supra note 12.
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1. Community-Internal Custom: Custom that impacts only community
members is easier to incorporate into property law than equivalent customs
that would require processing by third parties. In both contracts and property
there is a familiar related issue: custom should be known or at least
reasonably knowable to those who are bound by it. The communicative
tradeoffpointstoanotheraspectofthisproblemthathastodowiththeformat
of information. Evenif weareinclinedto enforceacustom,wehaveachoice
whether to enforce the version of it prevalent within the community, which
is intense from an informational standpoint, or to use the law to pare out
aspects of relevant context. This can be regarded as one aspect of identifying
a custom, a process that is far from trivial, as Richard Craswell has argued.61
If experts testify to the application of a custom to a given situation, they are
typicallygivingthecrystallizedresultofamoreimplicitandintuitiveexercise
of judgment.62 The communicative tradeoff points to the need to choose the
informational strategy — including the degree of invariance to context (i.e.,
formalism)—thatthecustomwillexhibitasappliedinalegalcontext.Among
theoutsiderswhohavetoprocesscustomarethelegalenforcers.Thus,totake
the example of the medieval grazing commons, the community itself or a
court very close to the community would enforce the stints and other rules
of proper grazing.63 There was little need to simplify or formalize customs
in such a context.64 All the participants, including the enforcers, were on
the same page. Indeed we ﬁnd in many of the successful common-property
institutions, such as those studied by Ostrom, Rose, and Acheson, that the
participants themselves are enforcers.65 Likewise, in merchant courts and
arbitration within associations there may be a preference for bright-line rules
or standards depending on the context (for example, mid-game versus end-
game), but there is less reason to formalize custom in the sense of creating
61 Craswell, supra note 23.
62 Craswell employs the semantics-pragmatics distinction to argue that customs can
carry different types of information in varying contexts. Id. at 129-35.
63 See, e.g., W.O. AULT,O PEN-FIELD FARMING IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND:AS TUDY OF
VILLAGE BY-LAWS 123, 137, 141 (1972) (stinting of sheep); ERIC KERRIDGE,T HE
COMMON FIELDS OF ENGLAND 77 (1992) (same).
64 Cf. AULT, supra note 63, at 53-54 (hypothesizing that the lack of early written
rules or case records on encroachment by planting on a neighboring furrow can be
explained by the obviousness of the rule in a close-knit community).
65 See, e.g.,E LINOROSTROM,G OVERNING THECOMMONS (1990); Rose, supra note 28;
James M. Acheson, Management of Common-Property Resources, in ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY 351 (Stuart Plattner ed., 1989).
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invariancetocontext.66Bothenforcersandduty-holderssharethebackground
informationto makeintensive communicationcost-effective.
2. Formalization of General Custom: The ﬂip side of the ease of
communicating intensively within a community is the need to strike a
different communicative tradeoff as custom applies more widely. One
major method of re-striking the tradeoff is to formalize the custom, i.e., to
decrease the dependence on context and hence its variance across contexts.
Partly because enforcers will be in a similar position to non-community
duty-holders and partly perhaps because this communicative tradeoff is an
ingrainedpartofourcognition,intheprocessofusingcustomasthebasisfor
more widely applicable legal rules judges and other legal decision-makers
will decrease the context-dependence of community custom as it travels out
of the community of origin to wider audiences. There will be a tendency to
make a custom more formal and standardized in the process of applying it
more widely (if it is so applied). We can hypothesize that in most cases it is
easierto communicate an exception to theright to exclude rather thana norm
of proper use, since the latter typically depends on contextual information.
Usingexceptionstothe right to exclude to solve problems across community
boundaries is easier than trying to communicate rules of proper use. Thus,
in cases in which strangers, rather than neighbors, are involved we expect
a tendency to loosen the right to exclude rather than to adopt complex
balancing tests that might require a great deal of contextualized knowledge.
Further, limiting custom that binds strangers to these simple rules can make
the result of judicial adoption of the custom more predictable to those who
will be bound by it.67 One example of this is the hunting custom: the default
license to hunt on unenclosed land is an exception to the right to exclude,
whereasﬁrstpossessioncustomsinvolvingwildanimalscanbeseenascloser
to rulesregulating activities.
3. Employment of Common Knowledge and Salience: Formalism is not
66 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry,2 1J .L EGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA.L .R EV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions,9 9M ICH.L .R EV. 1724 (2001).
67 The efﬁciency and fairness of making a custom binding for the ﬁrst time raises
related systemic and individual issues. From the systemic point of view, both the
custom and its legal force should be predictable. From an individual point of view,
a party may be aware of the custom even though actors in a similar situation would
not be. In such cases I would hypothesize that courts would turn to equity which is
both in personam and heavily reliant on notice.
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss1/art22009] Community and Custom in Property 23
the only way for a custom that is escaping its originating community to
reﬂect the communicative tradeoff. If the custom happens to depend on
knowledge shared more widely than only in the community of origin or can
easily be refashioned to do so, then the custom is a good candidate for wider
use, at least as far as the informational load it presents. One particularly
common strategy is to rely on salience, wherever salience comes from.68
Salience in some instances may reﬂect hard-wired aspects of mind, as where
judgments of closeness and lesser-goes-with-greater arguably drive the law
ofaccession.69Wesaythatincrementsofvaluesuchastheyoungofananimal
gowiththeownerofthemotherforamixtureofutilitarianandpsychological
reasons.70Inothercases,suchasthefamousexperimentinwhichmostpeople
independently chose to meet at Grand Central Station at noon, some type of
widely shared common knowledge is doing the work.71 As we will see, parts
of property law that regulate the behavior of anonymous interaction tend to
rely on these general sources of context. Thus, nearness is easier to employ
than notions of likelihood of capture when hunters and non-hunters might
encounter each other in the presence of a fox. We should tend to ﬁnd more
incorporation of community custom where the custom relies on knowledge
likelytobefoundoutsidethecommunityorreliesonsalienceandfocalpoints
that do not require intense interaction by theparties.
4. Impact of Higher Stakes: Another response to the possibility of a
custom traveling beyond its community of origin is simply to incur the
higher communication costs of making broader audiences responsible for
observing it. This can happen where the problem involves high stakes
and communicatively cheaper alternatives are not available.72Higherstakes
68 See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law,8 6V A.L .R EV.
1649, 1659-63 (2000).
69 DAVID HUME,AT REATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 327 (David Fate Norton & Mary
J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739); THOMAS W. MERRILL &H ENRY
E. SMITH,P ROPERTY:P RINCIPLES AND POLICIES 172-75 (2007); ROBERT SUGDEN,
THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS,C O-OPERATION &W ELFARE 87-88, 97-99 (1986);
Thomas W. Merrill, Establishing Ownership: First Possession and Accession (2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on ﬁle with author).
70 Carruth v. Easterling, 150 So.2d 852, 855 (Miss. 1963) (quoting 4 AM.J UR.2 D
Animals § 10). See generally Merrill, supra note 69.
71 THOMAS C. SCHELLING,T HE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55-56 (1963); see also id. at
97; Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, The Nature of Salience: An
Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games,8 4A M.E CON.R EV. 658
(1994); Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 ECON. J. 533 (1995).
72 Higher stakes canmakeincurringmore communication costs worthwhile. SeeSmith,
supra note 5, at 1155; Smith, supra note 43, at 966-997, 1007. The anti-formalism
of the Legal Realists and their successors can be regarded sympathetically as a
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lead to greater presumption of widespread common knowledge and a greater
tendencyforcustomtotravelbeyondtheoriginatingcommunity.Thewhaling
custom that required people ﬁnding harpooned ﬁnback whales washed up on
thebeachtoreportthem(andreceiveaﬁnder’sfeeinsteadofthewhaleitself)
seems to have bound people in the whaling community of Provincetown, not
just the whalers themselves.73 A one-industry town can afford to make such
informationaldemands.
***
In sum, I hypothesize that custom reﬂects a basic tradeoff in legal
communication. Custom is informationally intense only so long as it is
directed at a smaller, more expert audience. As it becomes more property-
like, in order to spread the custom must either draw on existing common
knowledge or it must be radically simpliﬁed. Only in cases of particularly
high stakes would we expect informational burdens to be placed on far-ﬂung
audiences of duty-holders.
Overall, intensive communication is easier within communities but
becomes more costly with greater distance from the community. As with the
exclusion strategy itself, the community can be regarded as a module in an
overall social and communicative system. Intensive communicative custom
is cheaper within such communities than across community boundaries. And
for some purposes it is useful if third parties can treat the community as
a black box. If outsiders are not held responsible for knowing community
custom or only a formalized version of it, much information can be hidden
behind the interface between the community in question and the rest of the
world.
III. COMMUNITY CUSTOM IN PROPERTY LAW
The use of custom in property is less free than in contract and varies
according to the type of property context. If property at its core uses an
exclusion strategy for anonymous interactions and reﬁnes this basic setup
through governance strategies in more contract-like settings, we expect that
response to the higher stakes of use conﬂict and other problems, or, less charitably,
as a fallacious disregard of information costs, or perhaps more realistically, as some
of both.
73 Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881). On the efﬁciency of the substance of the
rule, see Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence
from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON.&O RG. 83, 93 (1989).
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss1/art22009] Community and Custom in Property 25
the use of custom should track this distinction. Particularized customs that
require a great deal of community background knowledge should be used
in those more personalized property contexts in which governance rules
are used. Where property relies on the exclusion strategy we expect less
reliance on localized customs, through either non-adoption or formalization
in the process of being incorporated into the law. In this Part I will show that
community custom is subject to the communicative tradeoff and that the law
reﬂects a concern with the informational demands of custom when it travels
beyond its originating community. As expected, custom, if enforced at all
outside the community, is more formal the farther it is from the community. I
turn now to some applications of the information-cost theory of community
custom. Some of these examples are open to multiple interpretations. They
are meant as suggestive and illustrative of the propositions that can be
derived from the theory.
Perhaps the most familiar example of community custom in property law
revolves around norms of proper use in common property. Here the property
boundary and the community boundary largely coincide: the community
are the owners and have the right collectively to exclude the rest of the
world. Inside the boundary communities have often successfully instituted
governance regimes to solve the potential tragedy of the commons. Indeed
the grazing commons is often not tragic for precisely this reason, making
Hardin’s use of it as an illustration of "The Tragedy of the Commons"
particularly inapt.74
The law of co-ownership can be regarded as a mini-version of this
community common property. Anglo-American property law tends to take a
love-it-or-leave-it approach, based on partition and using the "exit" strategy.
Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, inspired by civil law, would like to
see a greater effort by the legal system to promote cooperative behavior
without giving up on the right to exit.75This liberalcommons, initsreliance
on governance, does make informationaldemands on co-owners.Butaslong
74 See sources cited insupra note 65; GarrettHardin, The Tragedy oftheCommons,162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968). However, Hardin popularized the treatment in the academic
literature. See H.S. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource:
The Fishery,6 2J .P OL.E CON. 124 (1954); Jens Warming, Om "Grundrente" af
Fiskegrunde,4 9N ATIONALO ¨KONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT 495 (1911), translated in P.
Anderson, "On Rent of Fishing Grounds": A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911
Article, with an Introduction,1 5H IST.P OL.E CON. 391 (1983); Jens Warming,
Aalgaardsretten,6 9N ATIONALO ¨KONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT 151 (1931).
75 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549
(2001).
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as this informational problem is conﬁned to the co-owners and does not lead
to potential liability for third parties, the property module prevents extensive
audiences frombearing large informationcosts.
More generally, institutions in the borderland between property and
contract pose interesting cases of the informational tradeoff. Merrill and
I have argued that intermediate areas like landlord-tenant, trusts, security
interests,andbailmentstendtoreﬂectanintermediatedegreeofintervention,
through enhanced notice requirements or protection (often from liability) for
the third party.76Inotherwords,thelawtriestoreducetheinformationalload
on more remote third parties. Sometimes these intermediate cases intersect
withrelevantcommunities.Whiletrade custom isfamiliarfrom contractlaw,
property law takes a somewhat warier view of corresponding community
customs.
Take for example the customs surrounding good husbandry in agricultural
leases. As I have shown in previous work, the law differentiated as to when
manure should be used on the land on which the producing animals grazed.77
In an agricultural lease, in which the tenant is part of the relevant community
of farmers, one might assume knowledge of this aspect of good husbandry.78
Bycontrast,manureisassimilatedtogeneralpersonalpropertywhenitcomes
to the question of whether, on the death of the owner, it should come into the
hands of the executor as personal property or go with the land directly to the
heir.79Intermediatebetweenthesetwosituationsaremortgageandsalecases,
in which the lender or buyer may well have more knowledge of agricultural
practice than an executor but not as much as a farmer. Here most but not all
courts held that the manure goes with the land.80 Notice that the farther we
get from the community the more general notions of personal property kick
76 Thomas W.Merrill & HenryE. Smith,TheProperty/Contract Interface,101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 843-49 (2001).
77 Smith, supra note 5, at 1122-25.
78 Generally in an agricultural lease the default was that the lessee must use on the
land manure produced by animals grazing on that land. See, e.g., Lassell v. Reed,
6 Me. 222 (1829); Daniels v. Pond, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 367 (1838); Middlebrook
v. Corwin, 15 Wend. 169 (N.Y. 1836); Hill v. De Rochemont, 48 N.H. 87 (1868);
Lewis v. Jones, 17 Pa. 262 (1851).
79 Pinkham v. Gear, 3 N.H. 484 (1826); 2 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY § 629 (3d ed.
1939). But see Fay v. Muzzey, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 53 (1859).
80 On mortgages, see, for example, Perry v. Carr, 44 N.H. 118 (1862); Sawyer v. Twiss,
26 N.H. 345 (1853). But see Staples v. Emery, 7 Me. 201 (1831). On sales, see,
for example, Kittredge v. Woods, 3 N.H. 503 (1826); Goodrich v. Jones, 2 Hill 142
(N.Y. 1841). But see Ruckman v. Outwater, 28 N.J. 581 (1860).
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in. If the question is enforcement against a nonmember of a community, then
manureis likelytobetreatedas free-ﬂoating personal property.
This tendency for the default to work in the direction of generality
and formalism is quite characteristic of the intersection of custom and
property law. Consider for example the famous issue of fencing in and
fencing out.81 It is well known that the law varies between fencing in and
fencing out, and that this choice correlates with whether ranching or farming
is moreprevalentin anarea.82 Robert Ellickson in hisstudyofShastaCounty
found that social norms were nonetheless uniform, in that they made animal
owners responsible for crop damage, regardless of the law.83 One possible
interpretationisthatthemessagetokeepoff,thedefaultregimeofpossession,
is easier to communicate to more far-ﬂung parties.84 Consistent with this,
Ellickson notes that there has been an inﬂux of ranchette owners who are
not insiders to the culture of the area. The general, formal default — here
the norms of trespass and exclusion — have a gravitational pull, beyond the
beneﬁtsintermsofthe relativeimportanceoffarming compared to ranching.
Even where a more nuanced ﬂip of the rule from fencing in to fencing out
would be efﬁcient in the narrow sense of maximizing the value of the two
activities, in close cases there is an additional reason to stick with the general
ruleoffencingin,becauseitcomesalongwiththegeneralexclusionregimefor
ownership of land, which is undemanding from an informational standpoint.
Onlywhenthenarrowefﬁciencyadvantageoffencingoutbecomeslargedoes
it make sense to move to fencing out. Although we are not in a position to
identify the exact point of optimality, there is some suggestive evidence in
favor of the prediction that in both law and norms fencing in will be more
widespread thanwould be expectedona narrow efﬁciency account.
Sometimes common-law judges are explicit about their concerns with the
informational load of particular customs applying to a more extensive set of
duty-holders. Whaling is an area in which robust customs were developed
in the industry and by and large adopted by common-law courts in legal
disputes over the ownership of whales. Ellickson argues that these customs
were efﬁcient for whalers who formed a close-knit group of repeat players.85
The customs varied by type of whale in a way that made sense: for faster and
81 ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 52-53, 72-76; Merrill & Smith, supra note 49, at
388-94; Smith, supra note 5, at 1116-17.
82 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass
Law,1 6J .L EGAL STUD. 149, 152 (1987).
83 ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 52-53, 72-76.
84 Merrill & Smith, supra note 49, at 388-94; Smith, supra note 5, at 1116-17.
85 Ellickson, supra note 73.
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meanerwhalescustom(andlaterthecommonlaw)wouldnotrequirewhalers
to maintain a line to the ship for ﬁrst possession. Ellickson takes whaling
customs as conﬁrmation of the hypothesis that close-knit groups will devise
norms that are efﬁcient for the group, but not necessarily for society or the
worldasawhole.(Indeedthecustomsweregoodatallocatingwhalesbutnot
at all effective at conserving them and avoiding a tragedy of the commons.)
Nevertheless, as we will see, courts in dealing with whaling cases are quite
clearabouttheirreservationsaboutparticularcustomsdisplacinggeneralrules
of thecommon law.
We can also hypothesize that even as between whalers, general norms
of possession may have had some stickiness. Thus, the fast-ﬁsh-loose-ﬁsh
rule seems to be the "default rule"; the rule that the ﬁrst harpooner has the
possession of the whale as long as the harpoon is connected by a line to the
boat looks more like general notions of possession based on certain control
than the more special ﬁrst-iron rule. Under this latter rule the ﬁrst harpooner
had an exclusive right to the whale as long as he was in fresh pursuit;
the ﬁrst-iron rule made sense for sperm whales which were both the most
valuable and the most dangerous. But even courts willing to adopt whaling
customs express reservations not just with binding non-consenting strangers
— as well they might — but with letting special rules leak out and confuse
the general law of possession. In Swift v. Gifford,86 Judge Lowell adopts the
ﬁrst-iron rule despite its derogation from the general law of possession. The
court addressed this problem directly:
The rule of law invoked in this case is one of very limited application.
The whale ﬁshery is the only branch of industry of any importance in
which it is likely to be much used; and if a usage is found to prevail
generally in that business, it will not be open to the objection that
it is likely to disturb the general understanding of mankind by the
interposition of an arbitrary exception. Then the application of the rule
of law itself is very difﬁcult, and the necessity for greater precision is
apparent.87
In response to arguments that the custom would "overturn[] a plain and
well-settled rule of property,"88the court did note anincreasing reluctance to
adopt particular customs and quoted as typical Justice Story’s observation in
86 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696).
87 Id. at 559-60.
88 Id. at 559.
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The Reeside,89acontractscaseinwhichhesatasCircuitJusticefortheUnited
StatesCourt of Appealsfor theFirst Circuit:
I own myself no friend to the almost indiscriminate habit of late
years, of setting up particular usages or customs in almost all kinds of
business and trade, to control, vary, or annul the general liabilities of
parties under the common law, as well as under the commercial law.
It has long appeared to me, that there is no small danger in admitting
such loose and inconclusive usages and customs, often unknown
to particular parties, and always liable to great misunderstandings
and misinterpretations and abuses, to outweigh the well-known and
well-settled principles of law.90
Judge Lowell does not take this as dispositive because, again, the custom
was conﬁned to the community of whalers from a particular port (probably
specializing in a certain type of whale). Moreover, Story’s statement can
be interpreted as a plea for respecting the communicative tradeoff: use
of particular customs which puts an informational burden on duty-holders
and enforcers — and one that grows as the distance between them and the
originating community increases. Again, in the property classic Ghen v. Rich
a custom of reporting beached ﬁnback whales that have been killed with a
marked bomb lance in return for a ﬁnder’s fee was upheld as applying to
the ﬁnder, because it was of limited application and could "affect but a few
persons,"91 and, quoting Judge Lowell, was "not open to the objection that it
is likely to disturb the general understanding of mankind by the interposition
of an arbitrary exception."92
By contrast, in somewhat less high-stakes cases the tendency to adopt
custom is weaker. Agricultural areas vary in terms of whether the ﬁnder or
thelocusownerbecomestheownerofanun-ownedswarmofbeesthatalight
on a tree (and their honey). In Fisher v. Steward,93thecourtrejectsevidence
oflocalcustomthatwouldhavefavoredtheﬁnderandinsteadappliesgeneral
notionsoftrespass and makesa strongpronouncementonuniformity:
It has been said, that, by the usage of this part of the State, the
person who ﬁnds bees acquires a property in them wherever found.
89 20 F. Cas. 458, 459 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657).
90 Id. at 459. For a discussion of a variety of judicial pronouncements for and against
use of trade customs, see LAWSON, supra note 10, §§ 4-5.
91 Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881).
92 Id. (quoting Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559-60 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696)).
93 1 Smith 60 (N.H. 1804).
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We recognize no such usage. We have no local customs or usages
which are binding in one part of the State and not in another. If this
be the law here, it must be so in every other part of the State.94
While this may be an overstatement, it does reﬂect an understandable policy
of formalism for extensive audiences.
Other famous episodes of adoption of custom into the law also involve
formalization of the relevant custom. Mining law is a potential testing
ground, although I leave development of this application of the information-
cost theory for further work. As mining customs, both with respect to mining
claims and water rights, were taken up into the common law and adopted
through state and federal statutes, some of the contextual factors that would
have been readily understood by mining camp participants were stripped
out. Much recent scholarship stresses the norms of fairness that miners
employed in setting up basic rules especially with respect to maximum
claim size, and the notions of fairness based on Lockean producerism and
notice seem to have depended on striking the informational tradeoff in favor
of stripped down communication for extensive audiences.95 It appears that
oneaspectofthisprocessofminingcustomsbecominglawisthatminerswho
moved from one camp to another knew what to expect; the rules were formal
(notheavilydependentonlocalcommunitycontext),butcouldbebentamong
more consenting, closer-knit groups.96 If miners’ rules relied on their being
focal, the more they conﬁned themselves to what generally leads to salience,
as opposed to highly local knowledge, the more effective they would be.97
Also, miners did not make up their norms out of whole cloth but selectively
drewongeneralpropertynormsandminingcustomsfromearliermines(e.g.,
lead), all of which is likely to make community custom easier to transmit to
extensive audiences. As McDowell points out, miners did not know when
they would be in the position of a new claimant and were therefore operating
behind a veil of ignorance;98 furthermore, earlier claimants had an incentive
to communicate their rules clearly to newcomers, which would require some
formalization.99
94 Id. at 62.
95 On the process by which mining custom became law, see, for example, McDowell,
supra note 28; David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice
in the Creation of Property Rights,3 2E COLOGY L.Q. 3 (2005); Zerbe & Anderson,
supra note 28.
96 McDowell, supra note 28, at 42-43.
97 Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 28.
98 McDowell, supra note 28, at 6, 58-60.
99 Id. at 44 ("The miners clearly attempted to devise some clear, conspicuous form of
notice that would indicate the boundaries of the claim and the name of its holder.
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How these rules were adopted into the common law (and later statutes)
is sometimes implicit, but courts do articulate the process on occasion.
For example, the Supreme Court of California, in a case about the notice
required to locate a lode mining claim and in which a state statute directed
courts to allow proof of customs respecting mining claims, had this to say
about the process by which mining law developed:
At the time the foregoing became a part of the law of the land there had
sprung up throughouttheminingregionsoftheStatelocalcustomsand
usages by which persons engaged in mining pursuits were governed
in the acquisition, use, forfeiture or loss of mining ground. . . . These
customs differed in different localities and varied to a greater or less
extent according to the character of the mines. They prescribed the
acts by which the right to mine a particular piece of ground could
be secured and its use and enjoyment continued and preserved and
by what non-action on the part of the appropriator such right should
becomeforfeitedorlostandthegroundbecome,asatﬁrst,publicijuris
and open to the appropriation of the next comer. They were few, plain
and simple, and well understood by those with whom they originated.
Theywerewelladaptedtosecuretheenddesignedtobeaccomplished,
and were adequate to the judicial determination of all controversies
touching mining rights. And it was a wise policy on the part of the
Legislature not only not to supplant them by legislative enactments,
but on the contrary to give them the additional weight of a legislative
sanction. These usages and customs were the fruit of the times, and
demanded by the necessities of communities who, though living under
the common law, could ﬁnd therein no clear and well deﬁned rules
for their guidance applicable to the new conditions by which they
were surrounded, but were forced to depend upon remote analogies of
doubtful application and unsatisfactory results. Having received the
sanction of the Legislature, they have become as much a part of the
law of the land as the common law itself, which was not adopted in
a more solemn form. And it is to be regretted that the wisdom of the
Legislature in thus leaving mining controversies to the arbitrament of
mining laws has not always been seconded by the Courts and the legal
It was in every miner’s interest to provide notice of his claim, to discourage others
from working it, and to support his case if it was jumped and there was a dispute.
But it was in the newcomer’s interest that notice be required, so that a claim that
was not clearly marked would be liable to be jumped.").
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 201032 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 10:5
profession, who seem to have been too long tied down to the treadmill
of the common law to readily escape its thraldom while engaged in
the solution of a mining controversy. These customs and usages have,
in progress of time, become more general and uniform, and in their
leading features are now the same throughout the mining regions of
the State, and however it may have been heretofore, there is no reason
why Judges or lawyers should wander, with counsel for the appellant
in this case, back to the time when Abraham dug his well, or explore
with them the law of agency or the Statute of Frauds in order to solve
a simple question affecting a mining right, for a more convenient and
equally legal solution can be found nearer home, in the "customs and
usages of the bar or diggings embracing the claim" to which such right
is asserted or denied.100
Here the court is defending a formalized version of custom against the
general common law as the appropriate rule in a more extensive context,
i.e., one that would apply to all miners, rather than only to those from
one district, and potentially might apply to others who are not miners
at all but belong to a wider community. At the very least the customs
employed by the court are more standardized than are the original more
local customs. And, to the extent that generalization involves stripping
out local contextual information and spelling out the implicit, these more
general customs are less information-intensive than the local community
variety.
A particularly prominent and controversial example of the role of
mining camp custom in the development of the law has been the doctrine
of the pedis possessio, and its reception into the law may reflect the need
to communicate in a more formal way with remote third parties. To have
a valid unpatented mining claim (a property right less than a fee simple)
under the General Mining Law of 1872, mining claimants must satisfy
requirements of both location and discovery, and for rights against the
United States both are essential.101 Nonetheless,a potential claimantis not
just concerned about rights against the federal government, but would also
be discouraged if third parties could jump his claim. Under the doctrine of
pedis possessio, a miner has the right to exclusively work the spot he is
currently working, even if he has not yet validly located a mineral claim.
In its original version in the mining camps this custom gave an exclusive
100 Morton v. Solambo Copper Mining Co., 26 Cal. 527, 532-33 (1864) (emphasis
added).
101 30 U.S.C. § 23 (2000).
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right to one working a spot against forcible, fraudulent, and clandestine
intrusions, but the scope was the spot one was working, not the entire
boundary of the unofficial claim.102 Undertheoriginal versionof the pedis
possessio, the "spot"involved was defined in termsof interferenceand was
fuzzy as to its scope.103Whencourtsappliedthisruletheyquicklyexpanded
theareacoveredtotheboundariesoftheclaim.104Themotivationforthiswas
in part to providegreaterprotectionforminers,butit is alsoconsistentwith
greater ease of processing by outsiders. To such outsiders the boundaries
of the claim are readily apparent, whereas the amount of land required for
noninterference would be more subject to interpretation and dependent in
parton local conditionsand expectations.
Suggestive of the informational role of the claim boundary is the pull it
exerts these days in the opposite direction. Despite a perceived need for
greater scope of protection for uranium miners in the exploratory phase,
courtshavedifﬁcultyin extendingthepedispossessio beyondtheboundaries
ofasingleclaim.Currentlyminingforuraniumrequiresselectiveexploration
over a large area, and a custom of mutual noninterference has developed, but
it is not legally enforceable, at least against non-agreeing parties. Without
being clear on the source of law, the U.S. Supreme Court has held long
ago that the pedis possessio does not apply to adjacent claims that are
not being worked. A few courts have tried to expand the pedis possessio
doctrine, but have drawn a great deal of criticism.105 Such courts can be
seen as trying to incorporate a more recent custom. For example, for a wide
pedis possessio (beyond a single claim that is actually being worked) the
court in MacGuire v. Sturgis106 required similar geology and reasonable size,
discovery work under state law, an overall work program, diligent pursuit
of the work program, and economic impracticability if the narrow version
of pedis possessio applied.107 These requirements are vague and presumably
require knowledgeofthe localuraniumminingindustry.But uranium miners
102 Union Oil v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
103 See, e.g., William J. Forman, Robert G. Dwyer & C. Robert Fox, Judicial
Uncertainties in Applying the Mining Doctrine of "Pedis Possessio," 3N AT.
RESOURCES LAW. 467 (1970).
104 Field v. Grey, 25 P. 793, 794 (Ariz. 1881); Miller v. Chrisman, 73 P. 1083, 1086
(Cal. 1903), aff’d, 197 U.S. 313 (1905); James M. Finberg, The General Mining
Law and the Doctrine of Pedis Possessio: The Case For Congressional Action,4 9
U. CHI.L .R EV. 1026, 1036 (1982).
105 MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580 (D.C. Wyo. 1971); see also Continental Oil
Co. v. Natrona Service, Inc., 588 F.2d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 1978).
106 347 F. Supp. 580 (D.C. Wyo. 1971).
107 Id. at 584.
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in a given area will encounter miners from elsewhere and others who wish
to use the land for different purposes. In the well-known case of Geomet
Exploration, Limited v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp.,108 the court rejected the
wider pedis possessio, limiting the doctrine to the bounds of a claim. This
seems to be the mainstream approach and has the advantage of ease of
communication to more extensive audiences. At various points in history
the claim boundary seems to have exerted an expansive or constricting pull,
in each case leading to a more formal version of pedis possessio than its
customary analog.
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Custom plays an often underappreciated role within property law, in addition
to its role as a separate system of social norms with purely private
enforcement. This Part explores the implications of the information-cost
theory of custom in the law for two key areas in property. First, because
custom potentially makes informational demands on third parties, it is in
tension with the numerus clausus. In civil law countries, those wishing
to reform or abolish the numerus clausus tend to invoke custom as a
source of law. Even in U.S. law, the courts’ willingness to incorporate
custom has led to tensions with even the weaker form of the numerus
clausus characteristic of the common law. Second, in takings law, the
longstanding problem of deﬁning the baseline of entitlements against which
regulations should be evaluated is potentially deﬁned in part by custom.109
108 601 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. 1979).
109 The baseline or background has long been a problem in takings. See, e.g., Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992) (holding that regulations that
prohibit all economically beneﬁcial uses of land are takings if they prohibit uses
not actionable under prior "background law" of property and nuisance); Richard
A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins,
64 U. CHI.L .R EV. 21, 22-28 (1997) (arguing for common law nuisance as the
baseline for takings law).
Custom and traditions should form part of the baseline for takings. See Carol M.
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,5 7S .C AL.L .
REV. 561, 598-99 (1984) (proposing that inquiry into property traditions will help
uncover ordinary understandings that need takings protection and those that need
to evolve). Nuisance is not the full sum of such a baseline but even nuisance itself
is based in part on local custom. See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 728-33 (developing
a theory of nuisance liability based on local community standards of behavior).
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The information-cost theory of custom in the law helps explain how custom
isnarrowedand formalized aspart ofthatbaseline.
A. Property Customs and the Numerus Clausus Principle
A large role for community custom in property law is in tension with
the need for property to reach a large and indeﬁnite audience of in rem
duty-holders. This standardization is ensured in part by the numerus clausus
principle, which limits the basic forms of property to a small closed set and
channels major innovations in this list to legislatures.110 Wholesaleadoption
of community custom would make the list of property forms a potentially
large and open-ended one. We have seen that courts, which themselves are
in the position of outsiders, have a tendency to limit or to formalize customs
beforetheycanmakeitontotheconstrainedmenuprescribedbythenumerus
clausus.
It is signiﬁcant that historically the numerus clausus arose out of a
concern about feudal custom.111 In the aftermath of the French Revolution,
many feudal customs were removed from property law under the banner of
thenumerus clausus. What is sometimes taken these days to be a formalistic
and conservative doctrine was at the beginning of its modern life a doctrine
for the wholesale stripping of custom out of property law.
This tension between detailed custom and the numerus clausus is also
reﬂected in the differing approaches to standardization in the common
and civil law. Growing out of the post-French Revolution period and the
Napoleonic codiﬁcation, the civil law put a high premium on ex ante notice
and a strong numerus clausus has always been one of its characteristics,
especially in Germany.112 By contrast the common law usually adheres to a
weaker form of the numerus clausus; until recently, indeed, the principle
was mostly latent and did not even have a name.113 Correspondingly, the
commonlawhasbeenmorewelcomingtocustomasasourceofpropertylaw
than have civil law systems. Some of the occasions on which the numerus
clausus has been the weakest have involved custom. For example, in
110 Merrill & Smith, supra note 39.
111 Id. at 7 n.15; see also E ´MILE CHE ´NON,L ES DE ´MEMBREMENTS DE LA PROPRIE ´TE ´
FONCIE `RE EN FRANCE AVANT ET APRE `SL ARE ´VOLUTION § 60, at 91-183 (2d ed.
1923).
112 Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 4-5, 9-12, 23-24.
113 Id. at 20-24; see also Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The
Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 239 (John
Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 3d Series 1987).
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International News Service v. The Associated Press,114 the U.S. Supreme
Court was willing to recognize a quasi-property right in hot news, and one
rationale for the decision is that news organizations had such a custom in
the ﬁrst place.115 Indeed, if misappropriation and unfair competition are to
be sources of new property rights, which is at least in tension with a strong
numerus clausus, trade customs and morals are a prime source for the rights
and duties. Nonetheless, the common law, despite some overenthusiastic
statements by some theorists, does not adopt community custom wholesale
but only moderately and in a simplifying fashion — consistent with the
weak numerus clausus.
Interestingly, current debates over the numerus clausus in China, Japan,
and Taiwan center on the role of custom. Those who would like to weaken
or abolish the civil-law-style numerus clausus in those systems invoke
the desirability of incorporating custom into property law.116 Overall, the
historical and ongoing perceived tension between the numerus clausus and
community custom conﬁrms the importance of the information-cost issue
highlighted in this Article.
B. Custom and Property Baselines in Takings
Custom plays a potentially important role in the law of regulatory takings. A
perennial problem in takings law is how to deﬁne the baseline of entitlement
against which a regulation’s effect on the owner’s property interest can be
measured. Is a land-use regulation an exercise of the police power or the
functional equivalent of an exercise of eminent domain?
In developing a series of per se rules that carve out classes of takings for
special treatment, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to be inﬂuenced implicitly
by the distinction between core and peripheral aspects of property. Thus,
permanent physical invasions, even by a small cable box and wires, will
count as a taking whereas much more intrusive regulations will not.117 This
per se rule is like the law of trespass in that it does not make an exception for
de minimis invasions. While one can argue whether such a de minimis
exception would be desirable, a bright-line and over-inclusive rule based on
114 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
115 See Epstein, supra note 6 (arguing for result in INS v. AP on the basis of prior
custom).
116 See Yin Tian, Reﬂection on the Criticism of Numerus Clausus,1F RONT.L .C HINA
92, 94-95 (2006) (discussing and citing literature).
117 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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physicalinvasionisaﬁrstcutatlanduseconﬂictthatdoesnotrelyheavilyon
local contextual information and is easy to communicate to the world at
large.118
Nonetheless, the right to exclude by itself will not furnish a strong enough
baseline. Regulations that do not lead to physical invasion may still "go[]
too far."119 On the other hand, if a restriction is longstanding enough, then
the owner cannot complain that it is a taking, even if the regulation is very
burdensome in terms of diminution of asset value. Likewise if the restriction
prevents a harm that the owner never had a right to commit, the regulation
doesnot effect a taking.
Most controversial in this regard was the attempt in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council120 to fashion a per se rule for takings that wipe
out all economic value. An exception to this per se rule was needed for
regulations that aim at preventing uncontroversialharms. Theopinion makes
much reference to the law of nuisance: if a regulation prevents what would
be a nuisance at common law, then the regulation is not a taking.121 The
dissentsandmuchcommentaryhavecriticizedthisuseofnuisancelaw.First,
nuisance law has always evolved and has not been the only source of change
in property baselines, so that the question of whether a regulation is truly
new is not an easy one.122 There is no reason to freeze the common law as
of a particular date, and the majority in Lucas acknowledged the dynamic
character of the nuisance exception.123 Second, a related matter, nuisance is
118 In the case of trespass, de minimis violations often happen without litigation.
Whether ade minimis exception ofsome sortwould trackordinary understanding
and thus be simpler is a closer case than the use of physical invasions to pick
out many cases for per se treatment. Although the Loretto result has come
in for a large share of criticism, see, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E.
Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV.L .R EV.
997, 1007-09 (1999) (calling the per se rule for permanent physical invasions
"passing strange" from the point of view of deterrence and distribution), viewing
it as the analog of trespass and the extension to a new utility (cable television)
of past practice (electricity, telephones) of using eminent domain makes it
understandable as an exercise in rough simplicity. See MERRILL &S MITH, supra
note 69, at 1297-98.
119 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
120 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
121 See id. at 1031-32.
122 See id. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1068-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 See id. at 1031.
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notorious for being indeterminate.124 It has been termed a "‘wilderness’ of
law,"125 a "legal garbage can,"126and a"mystery."127
The communicative tradeoff implicit in the choice of strategies for
delineating property rights helps resolve this dilemma. It is quite
understandablethattakingslawtendstoinvokethelawofnuisance.Nuisance
law comes closest to incorporating the ﬁne-grained detail of custom and
yet it is semi-formalized into a format that courts can use. In other words,
the law of nuisance, despite its faults, is appropriate for communication
beyond communities while solving some of the micro-problems that the
basic exclusion strategy does not. Although many have questioned why
only the law of nuisance should play this mediating role between more
informal norms and more formal law, it is an understandable starting point.
But nuisance is not likely to be the only governance scheme that forms
the baseline of what the owner does and does not have in the default bundle
of rights. Interestingly, some customs are important enough to register on
the legal radar screen independently of their role in the law of nuisance. In
those cases we might expect custom to form part of the property baseline in
special high-stakes situations.
OnesuchinstanceisthefamouscaseofMillerv.Shoene,128whichinvolved
a statute codifying a custom of favoring apple trees over cedar trees in the
presenceofadestructivefungus.ActingundertheCedarRustActofVirginia,
the state entomologist ordered a number of appellant Miller’s ornamental
red cedar trees to be cut down. The statute allowed $100 compensation for
removal but did not compensate for the value of the trees or the decrease in
the value of the land (but did allow the owner to use the trees as lumber).
The statute provided for a procedure to consider requests for tree removal,
includingrequestsbyofﬁcialsandneighbors, and itappliedto redcedars that
124 See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN.L .R EV. 1393,
1407(1993) ("[W]hat ismost strikingabout the holdingof Lucasis that itembeds in
the already muddy law of takings . . . the even muddier law of nuisance."); Michael
C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses,2 9H ARV.E NVTL.L .R EV. 321, 323,
333-34, 367 (2005) (noting that contextual analysis in nuisance law is in tension
with the categorical approach to takings in Lucas).
125 1 H.G. WOOD,AP RACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR
VARIOUS FORMS;I NCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFORE AT LAW AND IN EQUITY, at iii
(San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney 3d ed. 1893).
126 William Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault,2 0T EX.L .R EV. 399, 410 (1942).
127 Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries,6 5
HARV.L .R EV. 984, 984 (1952).
128 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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the state entomologist determines to be the source of, harbor or constitute
the host plant for the cedar rust, if the tree is within two miles of an apple
orchard. Cedar-apple rust travels between cedars and apples and harms only
theapples,whichareanimportantcommercialtreeinVirginia,andwhichare
far more valuable than the mostly ornamental cedars. Cedar owners received
no beneﬁts from controlling the parasite. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
therewasnotaking.Toreachthisresultitwasnotnecessarytodecidewhether
thekeepingof thecedartreeswasanuisance.
The case has led to a number of very expansive interpretations. Legal
Realistsandtheirsuccessorsmademuchoflanguagesuggestingaskepticism
about the public-private distinction: the state had to choose between the trees
andisfreetomakethischoice,hereforthemorevaluabletree.129Government
doing nothing is the same as doing something, or, in the Court’s words, "[i]t
would have been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present
statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple
orchards within its borders to go on unchecked."130 The very same language
has also been taken to have overtones of Coasean reciprocal causation.131
Neither tree owner, of cedar and apple respectively, can be said to cause the
interaction more than the other. Indeed in this case the physical spores travel
in both directions in their life cycle (the fungus is "heteroecious"), which
undermines usual notions of causation that Coase criticized.132 The Coasean
would see this as conﬁrmation that invasions are not really important even
in ordinary cases. Instead we have competing economic activities, one more
valuable than the other, and the direction of an invasion by objects is simply
irrelevant tothe economic problem.
In an important article, William Fischel calls some of these interpretations
into question.133Insteadofbeing"aneffectivenewlawofproperty,"134oreven
an exercise in Coasean nuisance-style balancing, that apple owners should
prevail over the owners of rust-infested cedar trees was an established and
129 See, e.g.,L OUIS M. SEIDMAN &M ARK V. TUSHNET,R EMNANTS OF
BELIEF:C ONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 27 (1996); Warren Samuels,
Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes,1 4J . L .&E CON. 435
(1971);seealsoBARBARAH.FRIED,T HEPROGRESSIVEASSAULTONLAISSEZ-FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
130 276 U.S. at 279.
131 William A. Fischel, The Law and Economics of Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and
Just Compensation in Miller v. Shoene, 3 REV.L .&E CON. 133, 149-51 (2007).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Samuels, supra note 129, at 438-39.
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well-known custom. The ability of the state to choose the more valuable use
was uncontroversial (not a breakdown of the public-private distinction) and
the lack of compensation responded to moral hazard concerns (opportunistic
claimsbyownersofcedarsthatweremorevaluablecutthanstanding).Apple
orchardownersusuallypaidtohavecedarsremovedconsensuallyandusually
did not invoke the law. Even after this case, cedar owners were compensated
for disruption to farming operations and incidental damage to land. Fischel
concludesthatthecasewasrightlydecidedbutthedictumthatthegovernment
could have decided the opposite was wrong; it would have been unthinkable
even to the cedar owners. The lead plaintiff in the case, Dr. Casper Otto
Miller, even voted for the 1914 law which passed 88-0 during his one term in
the Virginia House of Delegates. There was a baseline that was commonly
understood for this type of dispute — causation is not reciprocal. Common
law nuisance is not the only source of traditional understandings and
baselines.
Custom is part of the baseline deﬁning owners’ rights, but what is that
custom? Fischel offers a somewhat expansive version of the custom in the
background of Miller v. Shoene, as being one of "prices make rights."135 In
aconﬂictbetweenconﬂictingcommercialcrops,themorevaluableonewins.
Thisisaverygeneralbutveryvaguecustom.InsteadIsuggestthatthecustom
was simply about cedars and apple trees, and related high-proﬁle conﬂicts
betweencommercialspeciesledtosimilarspeciﬁccustoms(e.g.,barberryand
wheat).Fischelisrightthatthecontentofthecustomisbasedontreevalueand
that such a custom is not limited to these two trees, but in communicating the
custom more widely, the custom beneﬁted from the fact that this cedar-apple
rust problem was well known in the state of Virginia. It is unlikely that such
a custom would be applied wherever one could ﬁnd a commercial conﬂict on
an individualized basis, and indeed even on Fischel’s formulations it appears
that in his other cases of "prices make rights" the winning species has to
be vastly more valuable than the losing one (as was the case with apples
and cedars), again making the custom easier to communicate. The degree of
conﬂict required and the valuation would make a general legalized custom
of prices-make-rights difﬁcult to apply. (In related fashion, in the law of
nuisance, simple balancing of the worth of two activities is not the sum total
of the analysis: it is both more and less than that and relies on invasions of
boundariesmorethanisoftenportrayed.136)Acustomof"pricesmakerights"
would also have to incorporate all the cost-effective mitigation mechanisms
135 Fischel, supra note 131, at 156.
136 Smith, supra note 43, at 990-1007.
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that might be applicable in other as yet unspeciﬁed conﬂicts. Instead, the
cedar-apple custom appears to be a speciﬁc one in the context of high stakes.
But it is a narrow and formal one: apple trees win in the cedar-apple-rust
context.Eventhestatutoryversionofthecustomisfairlybright-line.Itmakes
little effort to distinguish between cedar trees or degree of infestation, etc.
Whatevertheproperlevelofspeciﬁcityofthecustom(s)involvedinthecase,
Fischel’s study makes it clear that the custom, as a commonsense solution to
a familiar problem, was a widely shared nonlegal norm.137 As such, it did not
present great informational burdens to third parties and was already part of
thepropertybaseline.
CONCLUSION
Community customs present a communicative problem when the custom
presumes more than the type of general knowledge common beyond
the conﬁnes of its community. In order for the customs of particular
communities to be suitable for use beyond the modular communities in
which they arise, the communicative tradeoff — of intensive, information-
rich messages versus reaching extensive audiences — needs to be restruck.
Either communication will be more costly for these remote third parties, or
the custom must be formalized, i.e., made less dependent on the community
context. Judges and juries largely lack community knowledge, and the
process of proving a custom and ﬁltering it through doctrines requiring
"certainty" with a view toward "generality" has the effect of adaptation
through formalization. Famous episodes of property customs such as mining
and whaling seem to conform to this pattern.
137 Fischel, supra note 131, at 189.
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